Executive Summary

The 1993 Report

In 1993, the Canadian Human Rights Commission (the Commission) issued a report, prepared by Professor Donald M. McRae of the University of Ottawa, on issues relating to the treatment of the Innu of Labrador by the Government of Canada (the Government). The report concluded that the Government had failed in its constitutional responsibilities to the Innu by not recognizing them as status Indians; by failing to provide them with programs and services comparable to those received by other First Nations people; and by relocating the Innu of Davis Inlet to a location that was not suitable to their physical, social, cultural or political well-being.

The 1993 Report made five recommendations to the Government (see box). It also recommended that the Commission monitor the implementation of these recommendations and conduct a follow-up review.

The Current Report

The current report, co-written by Professors Donald M. McRae and Constance Backhouse, fulfills this latter recommendation. The Terms of Reference for this report were to:

• assess progress made by the Government in implementation of the 1993 recommendations;

  
• consider the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in relation to the implementation of the 1993 recommendations;

   
• examine the situation of the Innu in relation to international human rights commitments to which Canada is a party;

  
• review the situation of the Government’s obligation to the Innu in light of its failure to provide treatment equal to that of other First Nations for the period 1949 to 2001; and


• make recommendations as appropriate.

Implementation of the 1993 Recommendations

Acknowledgement of federal constitutional responsibility

The 1993 Report found that, due to circumstances relating to Newfoundland’s entry into Confederation in 1949, the Government never acknowledged or assumed constitutional responsibility for the Innu of Labrador as provided under section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

Consequently, the first recommendation of the 1993 Report was that the Government formally acknowledge its constitutional responsibility to the Innu. Our current review found that, through various statements and correspondence between 1994 and 1997, the Government gradually — albeit reluctantly — acknowledged and agreed to assume this responsibility.

Funding arrangements

As a direct result of the Government’s failure to assume its constitutional duty, the Innu were denied funding for programs and services in the same way that other First Nations people received such funding. Rather, program funding was provided through a series of federal-provincial cost-sharing agreements that allowed for very limited Innu input or participation in program delivery and design. As a result, the 1993 Report recommended that the Government abrogate these arrangements and ensure that the Innu communities were provided funding, programs and services on the same basis as other status Indians living on reserve.

The last agreement between the Government of Canada and the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador (the Province) was terminated in 1997. The Government has now put in place direct funding relationships with the Innu. However, our review shows that the Province remains involved in both funding and providing education, health and social services. This is because full federal assumption of funding is dependent on the Innu being registered as status Indians and lands being set aside for them as reserves under the Indian Act. The 1993 Report recommended against their registration under the Indian Act, suggesting instead that accelerated negotiation of a self-government agreement would allow the Innu to operate under modern legislation. This option has proved unfeasible in the short term. Rather, the Government and the Innu have agreed to proceed with registration, although this process will take some time to complete.

The consequence of this decision is that, although the Innu receive funding for a wide range of programs and services, the role of the Province prevents them from having the same degree of involvement in and control over these programs that similar communities exercise and that was hoped would be the result of the 1993 recommendation. Moreover, special programs, such as the outposts program, which are designed to enable the Innu to preserve and promote their traditional way of living on the land, have not received adequate funding in recent years. It is our conclusion that, although the funding issue is moving towards the 1993 goal, it remains far from realizing it.

Self-government

As recommended in the 1993 Report, self-government negotiations were launched in 1994. These broke off in 2000 and have remained in abeyance pending the completion of registration and the creation of reserves. The Innu are concerned that when discussions do recommence the Government will attempt to impose municipal-style government on them, rather than a structure that recognizes the Innu’s independence.

Relocation of the Mushuau Innu of Davis Inlet

The 1993 Report recommended the relocation of the Innu of Davis Inlet to a new community, citing the unacceptable living conditions at Davis Inlet. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) subsequently described the conditions at Davis Inlet as being comparable to those found in the poorest of developing countries. In 1993, the Innu voted in favour of relocation, to which the Government agreed in 1994. Our review indicated that the relocation has been beset by delays and difficulties caused, in part, by the Government’s lack of proper management, as noted by the Auditor General. The relocation is now expected to be completed by the summer of 2003.

The physical environment

provided the greatest challenge to the relocation project, which is one of the largest of its type ever undertaken in Canada. Environmental factors such as a very short building season and the isolated location resulted in significant delays.

The financing of the project

was complicated by inaccurate cost forecasts and the consequent need to repeatedly obtain financial authorization. This in itself resulted in significant project delays, as authorizations often came too late to transport supplies during the short building season.

The management of the project

was to be jointly handled by the Innu and the Government. This arrangement was beset by problems often arising as a result of conflict between government requirements and the Innu’s own sense of how best to do things. In the end, these difficulties were overcome, albeit at a cost.

Innu involvement

in all aspects of the project was to be a guiding principle of the undertaking. This was seen as a means of building skills and developing capacity among the Innu to manage their own community. Although attempts were made to ensure Innu involvement, these were not uniformly successful. We found that Innu often ended up with the least skilled and most undesirable jobs. The Auditor General concluded that inadequate efforts had been made to ensure that the Innu had the ability to successfully manage the transition to the new community and ensure its good management in the future.

Social and economic aspects of relocation

constitute another matter that appears to have received inadequate attention. Relocation in itself will not resolve long-standing social and cultural issues such as alcohol and substance abuse by both adults and youth and related high levels of family dysfunction. The development of viable opportunities for economic development and employment is also urgent. The need for an appropriate social and economic plan is apparent, although it seems to have received little government attention or priority to date.

Funding to implement the recommendations

Funding for the 1993 recommendations has been provided by the Government but, again, there have been problems. Delays in funding approvals and the decision by the Government to place the Innu under third-party financial management have stalled the relocation and other projects. Disputes have also arisen over the allocation of funding. For example, although the Innu strongly favoured continuing the outposts program, they have failed to receive adequate funding from the Government. Compensation for non-existent or inadequate funding from the Government since 1949 is an issue that must yet be addressed.

CONCLUSION The Government is in the process of implementing its commitment to the relocation of the Mushuau Innu to the site chosen by them as proposed in the fourth recommendation in the 1993 Report. The relocation has been beset by difficulties, many of which might have been avoided if the Government had acted expeditiously.

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